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The logic of two-level games with endogenous lobbying :
the case of international environmental agreements
Houda HAFFOUDHI, LAEP
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THE LOGIC OF TWO-LEVEL GAMES WITH ENDOGENOUS LOBBYING: 
THE CASE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
 
 
Houda HAFFOUDHI? ? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
International environmental agreements (IEAs) are increasingly important in a globalized 
economy. The aim of our paper is study the effect of political pressure groups-lobbies- on the 
size and stability of IEAs. To this purpose we use the framework of two-level games to explain 
how national political situation influences the decisions of governments at the international 
negotiations arena. We present an endogenous lobbying model in which we assume that 
lobbies try to influence the policy choice of governments by offering political contribution in 
return for policy compromise. Indeed, we use the "interest based explanation" of international 
environmental policy to describe the incentives of countries to join an agreement. This 
approach classifies countries in four categories: pushers, bystanders, intermediate and 
draggers. We found that, when government gives the same weight to contribution and to 
social welfare, the contributions from the industrial lobby give incentives to government 
(Pushers, intermediate) to participate in the grand coalition making it stable. Our results 
suggest that in order to sustain the grand coalition, weak global environmental agreements -
i.e. those involving small abatement targets- should be negotiated. The result is similar if 
governments are more interested by political contribution. However, if governments care less 
about political contribution than about social welfare, industrial contribution is not enough to 
limit the free riding incentives of each type of government. In this situation, pushers are the 
more expected to sustain a small stable coalition. 
       
    Keywords : non-cooperative game, interest group, coalition theory, environmental Policy. 
    JEL Classification : C720, D720, D780, Q280 
     
 
   Résumé 
 
Cet article a pour objet d’étudier l’influence exercée par les groupes de pression lors des 
négociations internationales et son impact sur la taille et stabilité des accords 
environnementaux internationaux (AEIs). Pour ce faire, nous présentons un modèle de 
lobbying endogène dans lequel nous supposons que les groupes de pression recourent à la 
contribution politique pour influencer les choix politiques de leurs gouvernements. Notre 
modèle montre que, lorsque le gouvernement donne le même poids à la contribution et au 
bien-être social, la contribution politique du groupe de pression industriel donne assez de 
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motivations aux gouvernements pour participer à la grande coalition qui devient alors stable. 
Nos résultats suggèrent que pour soutenir la grande coalition, des accords environnementaux 
globaux faibles - ceux qui impliquent des cibles d’abattement faibles -devrait être négociés. 
Le résultat est semblable si les gouvernements sont plus intéressés par la contribution 
politique. Cependant, si les gouvernements se soucient plutôt du bien-être social, la 
contribution industrielle n'est pas assez importante pour limiter les motivations de free riding 
des gouvernements.  
 
    Mots-clés: Jeux non-coopératifs, groupes de pression, théorie de la coalition, politique 
environnementale. 
   Classification JEL : C72, D72, D78, Q28 
     
 
1 Introduction 
     
    Some of the most important environmental problems urgently calling for solution are 
problems related to global pollution. Environmental problems such as ozone depletion, 
climate change and marine pollution have been the focus of intense negotiations at the 
international level over the past two decades. International environmental agreements (IEAs) 
are examples of collective action to tackle such global problems. Beyond their specific 
interest, these agreements are also important in the context of coalition formation theory. This 
theory focuses on coalition formation mechanisms, i.e. on the incentives that lead to self-
enforcing international environmental agreements and define the number of the signatory 
countries. The presence of a strong free-rider incentive prevents most IEAs of being stable 
and/or effective. For studying these problems, non-co-operative game theory has proved to be 
a very fruitful approach. Furthermore, this approach shows that when countries reach a stable 
agreement, this involves a small number of participants. Basically, the models of Barrett 
(1994), Bauer (1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1992, 1993) and Hoel (1992) employ a stability 
concept borrowed from the oligopoly literature (D'Aspermont, et al., 1983) where a coalition 
is said to be stable if no country wants to accede to the coalition (external stability) and no 
country wants to leave the coalition (internal stability).  
    All works studying the problem of IEAs stability and abatement level have the 
inconvenient of assuming that governments maximize welfare function. However, recent 
events in the international policy arena have illustrated the extent to which organized groups 
condition environmental policy, both at national and multilateral level. Industry and 
environmentalist lobbies have been extremely influential. For example, in the USA, they have 
held different positions on some issues, such as multilateral emission cuts1. On others, such as 
the compliance of foreign legislation with American environmental standards, their objectives 
have often coincided2. Thus, we argue that there are political constraints that bind the hands 
of national governments that participate in the international negotiation process. The aim of 
our paper is to study the effect of political pressure groups-lobbies- on the size and stability of 
international environmental agreements. 
                                                 
1 While green lobbies have exercised "considerable influence on the negotiations" at Kyoto conference in favor 
of multilateral reductions in greenhouse emissions (Financial times, December 11, 1997), a broad coalition of 
corporations, unions and economic lobbies has organized " one of the most intensive campaigns ever mounted 
on a single political issue, seeking to convince that American curbs on greenhouse gas are unfair and damaging 
to the economy " (Financial Times, September 10, 1997) 
2 For example, both have demanded compliance of foreign legislation with American environmental standards 
on incidental catching of dolphins set out in the Marine mammal protection Act. 
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    To analyse government behavior at the international policy, Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994, 
2002) presented the approach of "interest based explanation" They explain that government 
position can be deduced from information about the country's ecological vulnerability and 
abatement cost. This analysis suggests that countries will act as « pushers » for substantial 
emission reduction when their ecological vulnerability to environmental pollution impact is 
high and their abatement costs for pollutant emissions are low. In contrast, countries 
characterized by high abatement costs and low ecological vulnerability can be expected to act 
as « draggers » in such negotiation due to the low benefit-cost ratio of pursuing emission 
reduction. Countries with both high ecological vulnerability and high abatement cost are 
caught in between the former two groups as they face an "intermediate" benefit-cost ratio, 
while countries that are neither affected by the environmental problem nor face high 
abatement cost will act as bystanders in international environmental negotiation. They expect 
that pusher countries take more stringent environmental positions than intermediate countries 
do, while the latter group is expected to favor environmental protection more often than 
draggers. The likelihood of bystanders' supporting environmental protection should fall 
between those for pushers and draggers; however, no direct comparison with the intermediate 
group seems to be appropriate on theoretical grounds. This study give an interesting 
explanation to government decisions at the international level but present the same 
inconvenient than the previous works, it doesn't consider national political actors and their 
effects on government policy. 
    Since we are mainly concerned with a positive analysis of both coalition formation and the 
size of a stable IEA, we assume then that authorities, rather than seeking social welfare 
objectives, pursue their own self-interest motives maximizing their political support. Our 
paper shares the interest of an increasing political economy literature, which examines the 
influence of interest groups on policy-making3. Most studies have focused on the role of 
producer groups in the determination of trade policy. In this area, the political contributions 
approach of Grossman/Helpman (1994, 1995 and 1996) is a sort of a standard model. A more 
recent body of literature, which includes Frederiksson (1997), Aidt (1998) and Conconi 
(2003) studied the political economy of environmental policy. These studies adopt the 
political contribution approach to study the impact of environmentalists and producer interest 
on environmental policy. But none examine the effect of lobbing by environmentalists and 
producer groups on the formation and stability of IEA. 
    In the majority of recent literature, lobbying is modeled as a "menu auction" where 
exogenously given lobby groups offer policy makers contribution schedules, representing 
binding promises of payment, depending on the chosen policy (Bernheim and Whinston 1986, 
Besley and Coate 2001, Dixit, Grossman and Helpman 1997, Grossman and Helpman 1994 
and 1996). In this paper, we propose an alternative model of endogenous lobbying where 
given the set of existing lobbies; the government chooses the lobbies with which it will 
bargain over policy in exchange for contribution. (Felli and Merlo 2002, 2003) 
    The aim of the current paper is to develop an international framework in which the 
Government's decision about IEAs' participation and abatement level (international level) are 
influenced by pressures of interest groups who organize a collective action through electoral 
contributions (national level). It is, therefore, assumed that lobbies try to influence the policy 
choice of the governments by offering them political contribution in return for policy 
compromise. To this end, we use the two-level games framework, which acknowledges the 
interplay between domestic politics and international relations (Putnam, 1988). This paper is, 
based on the notion that lobby groups pressure constitutes a political constraint that the 
governments face at home, and shapes the outcome of international agreements. Then, in the 
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national level we have a lobbying game. We have the bargaining game between government 
and lobby groups presented earlier. Each group propose its political contribution and 
government try to choose which national political coalition it will choose to maximize its 
objective function at the international level. Then, government considers lobby support when 
it decides about both its participation to the international environmental agreement and its 
abatement level in two following stages. Hence, in the international level, we have the 
coalition game in which governments decide non-cooperatively whether or not to sign the 
agreement. Two groups of countries emerge at the end of this stage: the signatories and the 
non signatories. In the third and last stage, governments play the non-cooperative Nash 
emission game, where governments, which sign the agreement, play as a single player and 
divide the resulting payoff according to a given burden-sharing rule. 
    We organized the remainder of the paper as follows. In section 2, we present the analytical 
framework. Section 3 sets out the basic model. In section 4, we determine the abatement level 
equilibrium. In the section 5, we present the results from our stability analysis. In section 6, 
we report on results of various sensitivity analysis. Section 7 summarizes the main findings, 
draws policy conclusions and concludes with some remarks about future research issues. 
 
 
2 An analytical framework 
 
The economic literature on international environmental agreements tends to treat the 
participant in international negotiations as monolithic and benevolent governments that 
sincerely represent the common interest of their country (see, eg., Barrett, 1997). While this 
approach has yielded many important insights, it appears somewhat incomplete and 
inappropriate, for analyzing the international environmental agreements' size and stability. In 
particular, it leaves out the idea that governments often have interests opposed or aligned with 
those of their domestic constituents, and that it is the incentive embodied in elections and 
other political control systems that ultimately determine what these governments can and will 
do at the negotiation table. These ideas have long been recognized by political scientists and 
public choice scholars, and have been formalized in the theory of two-level games. 
    In most international bargaining situations, negotiators attempt to find an agreement 
acceptable not only to the foreign countries with which they are bargaining, but also to the 
majority of their domestic interests. Negotiators often find themselves simultaneously 
engaging in domestic and international bargaining. Then the goal of this article is to present a 
formal model which reveals how domestic and international factors interact to shape 
international environmental cooperation between nations. This model examines the 
interaction between international environmental negotiations and a simple domestic political 
situation; it is a two level game. Such games have been discussed before, and a few studies 
have attempts to formalize the notion (Schelling, 1960; Walton and McKersie, 1965; Evans, 
Jacobson and Putman, 1993; Putnam, 1988. Formal models include Iida, 1991 and 1993; Mo 
1991; Morrow 1991; Lohmann 1993) but rare are those which have studied international 
environmental negotiations. 
    As the name of the theory suggests, the game is played at two levels: the international level, 
where the executives of countries involved in cooperation meet to negotiate the terms of an 
international environmental agreement, and the national level, where a political market 
constrains the set of politically acceptable actions available to the national representative 
during the negotiation at international level. The general structure of this game is illustrated in 
the following Figure: 
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Figure 1 : Two-level Games (source: Putman, 1988) 
 
The national political markets impose constraints on the representatives in many ways. We 
have the electoral incentives of the executive. Because the electorate is not a direct 
participant, it cannot directly influence the international bargaining, but it can influence it 
indirectly through election. Then government, in the international bargaining game has to 
make a proposal that is acceptable to his domestic constituents (Morrow, 1991). While voters 
are concerned about many different policy issues, they take a basic interest in the issue of 
environmental problems, although priority placed on it differs between countries (CEU, 
1999). Successfully reaching an IEA at the international level is, therefore, important for 
national politicians who want to demonstrate progress in the implementation of climate 
policy, for example, and, ultimately, for winning election. The adoption of emissions targets 
involves, as the same time, the benefits and cost perceived by different voters. Voters may 
well reward politicians for reaching international agreements, even though the "real" benefits 
of action against climate change are highly uncertain and would, in any case, not materialize 
until far into the future. On the other hand, greenhouse gas abatement is costly, and the costs 
are borne by firms and households immediately. Then when governments seek to implement 
climate policy, they risk losing votes from voters harmed by abatement decision. 
    Interest groups affect also government decisions (Olson 1965). Special interest groups: 
green lobby and industrial lobby- in particular Business associations and environmental 
NGOs- are able to affect the behavior of politicians by providing information, by financing 
election campaigns, or by bringing climate change problems to the forefront of the minds of 
the voter (Grossman and Helpman, 2001). 
    All these political factors are taken into account when the executives of the countries meet 
at the international level to decide whether or not they will accept to participate in the IEA, 
and define the abatement level that individual representatives would consider politically 
acceptable. The model presented is an example of nested game. We can think of international 
negotiation as consisting of domestic and international games that are played simultaneously, 
that is, players take a single action applicable to both games. 
 
Négociation
Internationale
Marché
politique
Pays 1
Marché
politique
Pays 2
AEI
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3 Model 
 
Consider a world of i=1,...,N countries, each of them emits a pollutant that damages a shared 
environmental resource. Each Government i's objective function is presented as follow 
 
 
 (1)   ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
i
h
i i g i i i i i g
h l
U q q B Q AC q C q qσ
∈
= − + ∑  
 
Where B(Q) denotes abatement benefits, ACi(qi) is country i's abatement cost, qi is i's 
abatement and Q represents the global abatement such that , ( )i
i
Q q Q a= ≤∑ . Chi >0 
represents the monetary contribution given by lobby h to the government. li represents the 
national coalition of interest group with which government prefers to negotiate. σi>0 
measures the intensity of each government's preferences over contribution with respect to 
environmental policy4. 
 
 
The country i's current abatement benefits are assumed to depend on current total abatement 
as follows 
 
2
( )
2
QB Q b aQ
 = −  
 such that Q a≤ .  
Where a and  b are positive parameter such that b represents the slope of each country's 
marginal abatement cost curve. 
Each country's abatement costs are assumed to depend on its own abatement level. For 
country i, the abatement cost function is assumed to be given by 
 
2( )
2i i i
cAC q q=  
    
The parameter c>0 represents the slope of each country's marginal abatement cost curve. This 
cost isn't sufficiently high to make producer profit negative. 
In this paper, we propose an alternative model of lobbying where the elected policy-maker 
chooses the lobbies that participate in the policymaking process. This is the sense in which 
lobbying is endogenous in our model. We assume that given the set of existing lobbies, the 
government chooses the lobbies with which it will bargain over policy in return for 
contribution (Felli and Merlo, 2002). 
We model environmental policy making as the outcome of a political process that involves 
not only elected government but also non-elected political agents know as lobbies. We 
assume that there are 2 lobbies: Environmentalist and industrial respectively E and I which 
differ with respect to their policy preferences. Each lobby h has a most preferred policy 
outcome qI and qE respectively. 
                                                 
4 if σi=0 governments are purely policy-motivated and lobbying is irrelevant, that is the case usually presented in 
environmental policy literature, where B(Q) - ACi(qi) represents country i global welfare. In this case 
government abate qg his most preferred policy. 
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Each lobby h is assumed to be able to sign binding contracts on environmental policy choice 
with government in exchange for contribution transfers. Notice that the government has the 
option of not signing any contract and of implementing his most preferred policy qg . 
 
    We suppose that only environmentalists have environmental concerns and that their ideal 
abatement level is E
aq
N
= .The environmentalist's current benefit from abatement decision 
takes the following form: 
 
 
 (2)  ( , ) ( , ) ( , )E E Ei i E i E i i EV q q q q C q qν= −  
     
Where 2( , ) ( ) ( , ). ( , ) ( )
2
E
i E i i E i i E E i
bq q B Q D q q D q q q qν = − = − , represent the damage 
generated by the abated emission.  
 
Then, environmentalists' preferences depend on the global benefit generated by the total 
abatement realized by all countries and on the damage caused by the non-abated emissions 
consisting in the difference between their ideal point (qE ) and their country current abatement 
level (qi). 
 
    When environmentalists gain from the increases in total (global) abatement effort, this 
means that an environmentalist group in a country j will support its own government even 
though abatement effort has been made in some country i. This means that government will 
be rewarded by its environmentalist group for having incited other government to participate 
to the collective abatement effort. But, global benefit isn't sufficient to explain why an 
environmentalist group is supporting its own government. We assume that it will only do so, 
when its own government undertakes additional abatement effort. To introduce this condition, 
we suppose that environmentalists are harmed by the damage caused by the non-abated 
emissions consisting in the difference between their ideal point (qE ) and their country current 
abatement level. Then environmentalist group reduces it government support both when 
government doesn't take any abatement decisions and when its abatement decision is lower 
than environmentalist ideal abatement level (qE). Then the more the government abatement 
level is closed to the environmentalist group ideal point, the more it will be supported. 
    Industrialist groups are always harmed by their government abatement decisions and their 
abatement cost is assumed to depend on its own abatement level and nor one else's and it 
takes the following form: 
 
 (3)  ( , ) ( , ) ( , )I I Ii i I i I i i IV q q q q C q qν= −     
Where 2( , ) ( , ). ( , ) ( ) 0.
2
I
i I i i I i i I I i I
cq q AC q q AC q q q q et qν = − = − = Then industrialist group 
abatement cost is no else than its country's abatement costs. 
 
We denote { },I EΛ =  the set of lobbies. Let  
 
{ } { } { } { }{ }, , , ,I E I E∆ = ∅  
 
 8
be the collection of all possible coalition of lobbies with whom government may choose to 
participate to the IEA and to bargain over abatement policy and contribution. 
 
    Each possible coalition li∈∆ is associated with a willingness to pay, ( , )
il i g
q qω , for any 
policy qi the government may choose to implement instead of his most preferred policy qg ; 
 
(4)  ( , ) ( , )
i
i
h
l i g i i g
h l
q q C q qω
∈
=∑  
such that  { } ( , ) 0i gq qω ∅ =    
  
    Given the preferences of a lobby specified is equation (2) above, the willingness to pay of 
lobby h∈li for any abatement policy qi implemented by government is 
 
 (5)  ( , ) ( , ) ( , )h h hi i g i h g hC q q q q q qν ν = −     
     
   ( , )hi i gC q q  is the monetary value of utility gains (or loss) with respect to the status quo that 
lobby h obtains if government chooses abatement level qi instead of its most preferred policy 
qg applied in the status quo. 
    The status quo is here defined to be government decision in absence of any lobbying, qg. 
        Given lobby groups preferences specified in equation (2) et (3), each lobby political 
contribution takes the following forms: 
 
   
2 2
2 2
( , ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( )
2
( , ) 2 ( )
2
g i
g i
E
i i g g E g i
I
i i g I g i
bC q q B Q B q q q q q q
cC q q q q q q q
 = − + − − − 
 = − − − 
 
 
The willingness to pay ( , )
il i g
q qω of national political coalition li, for any policy qi that 
government may choose instead of its ideal policy qg, takes the following form:  
 
 (6)   2 2 1 2
1( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 g i
i
h
i i g g g i
h l
C q q B Q B q b q q S q q Sα
∈
  = − + − − −    ∑  
 
where 1 2,
i i
h h
h h h
h l h l
b bS S q such that b b si h E et b c si h I
b b∈ ∈
= = = = = =∑ ∑ . Then, for all 
possible coalition of { } { } { } { }{ }, , , ,I E I E∆ = ∅ , S1 takes as values { }0,1, ,1 cwith bλ λ λ+ =  et 
S2 takes as values { }0,1,0,1  respectively. The parameter α indicates the existence of the 
environmentalist lobby group in the national political coalition li. α=1, if government 
consider the political contribution proposed by the environmentalist lobby group and α=0 if 
not. Then, for all government political choice there is a willingness to pay. 
 
Our model does not explain the process of lobby formation. We simply assume that only two 
groups of citizens overcome the free-riding problem described by Olson (1965) and get 
politically organized: a proportion of the population, the "environmentalists", who form a 
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national green lobby and the industrialists, who form producer lobby. This model is first 
concerned with establishing the effects of political support motives on the determination of 
emission abatement and then the number of countries signing a stable IEA. 
 
 
4 The equilibrium 
 
Following the approach of the non-cooperative game theory of coalition formation, we 
assume that countries decide simultaneously in the last two stages of our model. In the first 
stage-the coalition game- they decide non-cooperatively whether or not to sign the agreement. 
The equilibrium number of countries participating in an IEA is then derived by applying the 
notions of internal and external stability of a coalition originally developed by D'Aspremont 
et al. (1983). In the second stage, they play the non-cooperative Nash emission game, where 
the countries, which sign the agreement, play as a single player and divide the resulting 
payoff according to a given burden-sharing rule. 
 
    We use a feedback resolution to resolve our two stage non cooperative game. We begin by 
the determination of signatories and non signatory countries abatement. Then, we determine 
the size of stable coalition which depends on national lobby support. Finally, we deduce 
which national political coalition will maximize each government payoff at the equilibrium.  
 
    We suppose that there are two groups of countries. We assume that s identical governments 
sign an agreement and N-s do not. Let sQ denote the abatement level of the coalition, and siq  
denotes the abatement of any individual signatory, such that s siQ sq= . In a similar manner, 
each non-signatory government's abatement is nsiq  yielding a total abatement of all non 
signatories ( )ns nsiQ N s q= − .Global abatement level is ( ) ns si iQ N s q sq= − +  
 
We assume that countries decide simultaneously in both stages. The non-signatories behave 
non-cooperatively when signatories choose their abatement level by maximizing their 
collective payoff function. That is, non-signatories choose nsiq by solving the following 
maximization problem. 
 
(7)   ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
ns
h
ns ns g ns ns ns ns ns g
h l
U q q B Q AC q C q qσ
∈
= − + ∑  
 
Explicitly, each non-signatory government objective function takes the following form: 
 
2
2( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 2
ns
h h
ns ns g ns ns ns h g h
h l
Q cU q q b aQ q q q q qσ ν ν
∈
   = − − + −     ∑  
 
The non-signatory abatement level verifies the following equation:  
 
(7’)   ( ) ( , ) ( )
ns
h
ns ns ns g ns ns
h l
MB Q MC q q MAC qσ
∈
+ =∑   
 
where MB : marginal global benefit, MC : marginal Contribution and MAC : marginal 
abatement cost.   
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Signatory’s governments choose Qs by solving the following maximization problem. 
   
(8)  ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
s
h
s s g s ns s s s g
s N s N s N h l
U q q B Q AC q C q qσ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
  = − +     ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
 
Explicitly, signatory’s objective function takes the following form: 
 
2
2( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 2
s
h h
s s g s s s h g h
s N s N s N h l
Q cU q q b aQ q q q q qσ ν ν
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
     = − − + −          ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
 
where . ( )s nsQ s q N s q= + − . Government member of the coalition considers not only its 
national contribution but also contributions received the other member to remain in the 
coalition. Signatory’s governments abatment level verifies the following equation :  
 
(8’)   ( ) ( , ) ( )
s
h
s s s g s s
s N h l
MB Q MC q q MAC qσ
∈ ∈
 + =  ∑ ∑   
 
 
Using  équations [7’] et [8’], we can resolve the second stage of the game. The result is 
presented by the following proposition: 
 
 
Proposition 1 :  
 
Each government abatement level decision depends not only on its national political process 
but also on the political process in the foreign country. The individual abatement level of 
signatory and non signatory government take the following form : 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
2
2 2 2
1 11
1 11
s s ns
s ns ns ns s s s nss s ns
s
ns ns s
ns s s s ns ns ns sns ns s
ns
s S N s S s Ss s
q a
S s s S S
q a
σ χ σ α σ σ α σσ α χ
ϕ ϕ
σ χ σ α σ σ α σσ α χ
ϕ ϕ
  + − + − ++   = +
  + + − ++   = +
  
where
( ) ( )( )2 1 11 1 , . , ,s nss s ns ns ns s s ns s s ns ns cs s N s s S S bϕ σ α χ σ α χ χ χ χ σ λ χ σ λ λ= + + − + + = + = + = .  
 
 
Hence, for coalition structure s, ( ) ( , ) ( )
s
h
s s s g s s
s N h l
MB Q MC q q MAC qσ
∈ ∈
 + =  ∑ ∑  holds for a 
member ci∈  in equilibrium and for a singleton j 
( ) ( , ) ( )
ns
h
ns ns ns g ns ns
h l
MB Q MC q q MAC qσ
∈
+ =∑ . Thus, joining coalition s has the advantage that 
own abatement efforts are matched by other members and hence higher benefits, but also 
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means higher abatement costs and higher/lower lobby contributions. Both effects determine 
whether a coalition is stable, which is checked in the following section. 
We have always 0ncq >  and 0cq > which guarantees that our solutions are interior. The 
remaining problem is to determine the number of signatories to the self-enforcing IEA. 
 
 
5 The size of stable IEAs 
 
We now proceed with the determination of the size of the stable IEA, denoted by s*, using the 
internal and external stability conditions. Recall that the internal stability condition ensures 
that if a government were to defect unilaterally, its gains from free riding would be 
outweighed by the adjustment (due to its defection) of abatement levels of the remaining 
members of the IEA. The external stability condition ensures that no other non signatory 
government finds it beneficial to unilaterally join the IEA; formally, the internal and external 
stability conditions satisfy this definition: 
 
Definition: An IEA consisting of s signatories is self-enforcing if 
* * * *( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( )s ns s nsM s M s et M s M s> − + <  
 
        
    A full characterization of solution cannot be obtained analytically for this functional 
specification. However, simulations reveal a very simple and compelling relationship between 
σs, σns and 
c
b
λ = . 
    We test all coalition structures for stability using our political economy model. To simplify 
our presentation, we suppose that b takes three values (0.01, 1,100), c takes as values (0.01, 1, 
100). In our benchmark scenario, when governments are immune to the pressure of lobby 
groups (i.e. σ=0), it turns out that there are only one stable coalition of small size (s*=2) such 
that λ>1 (b=0.01 and c=100). There were only internally stable coalitions, but none of these is 
externally stable. This stresses the presence of strong free-rider incentives in our framework. 
This situation, however, is different once the government considers political pressure factors -
-lobby contributions- into its payoff function. In the following we report on the results for this 
exercise, considering the case of σs =σns =1 for both signatory and non-signatory 
governments. 
 
    Figure 2: Stable coalitions under different lobby contributions 
     
Signatories 
Lobby ∅ Environmentalist Industrial Environmentalist and Industrial 
∅ 2 (0.01-100) Grande coalition (0.01-100) Grande coalition Grande coalition (0.01-100) 
Environmentalist 2 (b>c) 2 (0.01-100) Grande coalition 7 ou 2  (0.01-100) 
Industrial 2 (0.01-100) Singleton 2 ou 5 (b<c) Singleton N
on
-s
ig
na
to
rie
s 
Environmentalist 
and Industrial Singleton 2 (0.01-100) Grande coalition 5  (0.01-100) 
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    From figure 2, we can observe that once governments include in their decisions the level of 
political pressure that the lobby groups exert -in the form of monetary contributions- stability 
and size of coalition increase. There are no non-trivial stable coalitions in thirteen of our 
scenarios. Among these, the grand coalition is stable in five of the cases. We also can observe 
that the extent of this improvement is determined mainly by the decisions of signatories and 
their abatement and cost characteristics. Indeed, stable coalition, if it exists, happens globally 
when b =0.01 and c=100. 
    More specifically, when signatories continue to be immune to lobby influence, small 
coalition is stable independently of non-signatories' decision about with which lobby they 
bargain. The situation does not improve much when non-signatories bargain with 
environmental lobby group or both lobbies; in this case only one possibility gives a large 
stable coalition, that is when no-signatories are immune to lobby contribution. 
    If signatories decide to accept only the contributions of the industrial lobby, the stable 
coalition emerge independently of signatories' decision about with which lobby they bargain. 
We have coalition of size two and five if signatories have the same national political choice 
and the grand coalition (i.e. an agreement of all countries) if not. Differently to the others 
cases, the grand coalition is stable for all values of b and c. 
 
 
Proposition2: 
 
Once governments include in their decisions the level of political pressure that the lobby 
groups exert, stability and size of coalition increase. Basically, industrial lobby contribution 
reduces the incentive of free riding and can incite signatory governments to sustain the grand 
coalition when the non-signatory government has different national political preferences.  
 
 
    To explain government decisions which emerge from our model, we have to determine the 
solution of our to stage game. Figure 2 gives all stable coalitions under different lobby 
contribution but didn't specify which one maximizes government payoff function. The 
solution depends on abatement cost and benefit parameters, and is given by table 1. 
 
 
    Table 1. Lobby coalition which maximize government payoff under Stable coalitions 
 
          ecological vulnerability (b) 
  0.01 1 100 
0.01 Grande coalition Grande coalition Grande coalition 
1 7 Grande coalition Grande coalition 
abatement 
cost (c) 
100 2 7 Grande coalition 
(a) 
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  ecological vulnerability (b) 
  0.01 1 100 
0.01 {{I,E}, {E}} {{I},∅} ; {{I}, {I,E}} 
{{I}, ∅}; 
{{I},{I,E}}; 
{{I},{E}} 
1 {{I,E}, {E}} {{I},∅} ; {{I}, {I,E}} 
{{I}, ∅}; 
{{I},{I,E}}; 
{{I},{E}} 
abatement 
cost (c) 
100 {{I,E}, {E}} {{I,E}, {E}} 
{{I}, ∅}; 
{{I},{I,E}}; 
{{I},{E}} 
(b) 
     
    Table 1 presents the solution of our game. It gives government decision about its 
participation to IEA and with which lobby it bargain to maximize its payoff function. The 
grand coalition, when signatories receive support only from the industrial lobby, represents 
the solution of our model if b is high and b>c. Nevertheless, there are other stable coalitions, 
namely a coalition of size seven and the singleton coalition, which emerge at the equilibrium, 
when b<c and signatories are supported by environmental lobby or both lobby. 
    Government position can first be deduced from information about the country's ecological 
vulnerability (b) and abatement cost(c) (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994). By combining these 
two indicators, governments can be classified into four categories, as follow: 
 
    Figure 3: Prediction of interest-based explanation from government negotiating 
position 
 
ecological vulnerability  
Low High 
Low Bystanders  Pushers  abatement 
cost 
High Draggers  Intermediates   
   Sources : Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994, 8 
 
 
    The interest-based explanation proposed by Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994, 2002) suggests 
that countries will act as « pushers » for substantial emission reduction when their ecological 
vulnerability to environmental pollution impact is high and their abatement costs for pollutant 
emissions are low. In contrast, countries characterized by high abatement costs and low 
ecological vulnerability can be expected to act as « draggers » in such negotiation due to the 
low benefit-cost ratio of pursuing emission reduction. Countries with both high ecological 
vulnerability and high abatement cost are caught in between the former two groups as they 
face an "intermediate" benefit-cost ratio, while countries that are neither affected by the 
environmental problem nor face high abatement cost will act as bystanders in international 
environmental negotiation. 
    The interest based explanation allows an initial understanding of possible positions taking 
by countries in international environmental negotiations. However, it doesn't explain why we 
have stable coalition when government considers its national political coalition support, 
whereas, in the base case, (without lobbies' influences) the singleton is the most frequent 
situation. 
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    Following this approach, we can deduce (from table 1, (a)) that contribution helps to reduce 
the free rider incentives present in the coalition when countries do not receive any support 
from lobbies. Countries characterized as pushers do not have any incentive to form a stable 
coalition in the "base case". However, when countries consider industrial lobby support they 
are willing to participate to the grand coalition (table 1, (b)). Indeed, each government 
receives a positive contribution from industrial lobby, because they perform an abatement 
level lower than that resulting from the scenario (O,O)-henceforth also called as "base case". 
Given their high level of marginal benefit, pushers are interested in higher levels of global 
abatement. The level of abatement in the "base case" corresponds to the government's most 
preferred level of abatement (qg). The industrial lobby benefits from the decision of countries 
to have a lower abatement level than in the "base case", hence is willing to make a positive 
contribution to compensate for the associated costs (table 2). 
    Intermediates present the same incentive than pushers in the "base case". Considering 
industrial lobby support they are also incited to participate to a large agreement but given 
their high level of marginal abatement cost, their abatement level is lower than that of 
pushers. This ensures that each government receives a level of contribution from the industrial 
lobby sufficient to compensate it for the forgone benefits due to the lower level of global 
abatement compared to "base case" situation. 
    Countries that are expected to act as bystanders do not have any incentive to form a stable 
coalition in the "base case". Although they may participate to a self-enforcing IEA when they 
consider industrial lobby contribution (grand coalition, Figure 1), they maximize their gain 
when they avoid a coalition. Each government prefers to behave as singleton coalition without 
considering lobby contribution. When they consider both lobbies support, they receive 
positive contribution from environmental lobby as they abate more than in the "base case" and 
they lose small support from industrial lobby as, given their small marginal abatement benefit, 
this increase in small. Globally they gain more in this situation compare to the grand situation 
when they receive contribution from industrial lobby. However, given their low marginal 
benefit, bystanders prefer to be immune to lobby influence and not to increase their abatement 
level. This government maximizes their gain when they remain in the status quo. 
    On the contrary, draggers may have incentives to participate to an agreement in the base 
case. In our benchmark scenario, when governments are immune to the pressure of lobby 
groups, it turns out that the coalition of size two is stable (Figure 2). For instance, given their 
high marginal abatement cost, each government is interested in low level of abatement and 
forms a small coalition when costs are very high (with c=0.01 and b=0.01). When 
governments consider both lobbies contribution, they receive enough compensation to form a 
coalition of size seven (table 1, a, b). Given its cost-benefit structure, each signatory's 
government will abate a medium level of abatement but higher level than qg. This ensures 
that, on the one hand, this government receives a high level of contribution from the 
environmental lobby sufficient to compensate it for the forgone due the higher level of global 
abatement compared to the "base case" situation; and, on the other hand, hey loose a small 
support from industrial lobby. Globally, draggers receive a positive contribution from both 
lobbies enough to sustain an agreement. 
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Proposition 3 
 
The size of stable coalition depends not only on national political coalition but also on benefit 
cost structure of each government. Considering political contribution, pushers are the most 
expected to sustain a large coalition (industrial contribution) Draggers are the less expected 
to form a stable coalition (environmental or two lobbies contribution). Intermediate are 
caught in between the former two groups (industrial lobby contribution). Nevertheless, each 
government decision change when it changes its national political coalition.  
 
 
    However, when costs are very high, government expected to behave as draggers maximize 
their gain when they avoid the agreement. The incentives of free riding are very important in 
this situation. Although in the base case, we have small stable coalition when costs are high, 
considering environmental lobby support, the contribution isn't enough to reduce free riding 
incentives. Given the high marginal abatement cost, each dragger acting as a singleton has 
incentive to have low level of abatement. Each government receives positive contribution 
from industrial lobby, due to the lower level of abatement compares to the situation of "base 
case" sufficient to break the coalition. 
 
     
Table 2: Results for stables coalitions for each type of government (with and without 
lobby contributions) 
 
    Countries Abatement 
(no  
contributions) 
Abatement 
(with 
contributions) 
net Gain  
(no 
contributions)
net Gain  
(no 
contributions) 
Contributions 
Pushers(a)* 
- 
9,9999 
999,990 
9,999 
- 
999,900 
- 
49 999 950 
 
5 107 
- 
 
CIs=0,01 10-2 
Intermediates 
- 
9,901 
990,100 
9,9 
- 
990,000 
- 
49 500 099 
 
4,9999 107 
- 
 
CIs=0,9704 
Draggers(1) 
- 
5 
500 
5,884 
6,716 
665,819 
- 
3737 
 
5,1111 103 
5,1107 103 
 
CEs= 691,66 
CI=-4,81 
CEns= 691,69 
Draggers (2)(b) 
0,198 
0,099 
10,097 
0,131 
0,197 
19,575 
98,50 
99,97 
 
287,92 
287,22 
 
CEs= 95,32 
CI=-0,37 
CEns= 95,33 
Bystanders 
- 
9,901 
990,100 
9,950 
- 
995,000 
- 
50,0051 
 
49,9974 
- 
 
CEs= 0,3583 
CIs=-0,0048 
 
    * : Similar result for the other cases. (a): caes b=100 and c=1,  (b): case b=0,01 and  c=100, Draggers (1):the 
two other cases ,  - : don’t exists 
 
    Table 2 gives the abatement level and payoff for signatories (grand coalition) and/or non 
signatories (small coalition or singleton coalition respectively) and the total abatement level in 
the case of small coalition. From table 2, it is evident that without the contribution of the 
industrial lobbies the grand coalition is not stable. Pushers gain more than intermediates by 
participating to a large agreement. Draggers are the most gainer by sustaining a self-enforcing 
IEA when they consider both lobbies contribution. In addition, we find that pusher countries 
take more stringent environmental positions than intermediate countries do, while the latter 
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group is expected to favor environmental protection than draggers. The likelihood of 
bystanders' supporting environmental protection fall between those for pushers and draggers; 
however, no direct comparison with the intermediate group seems to be appropriate on 
theoretical grounds. 
 
 
Proposition 4: 
 
A large stable coalition corresponds to a weak agreement - an agreement that not involve a 
high level of abatement. Compare to the status quo. A stringent environmental agreement, if 
they emerge, will be sustained only by a small number of countries. 
 
    All regions, with the exception of part of draggers, would gain by leaving the coalition and 
becoming free riders. If countries do not respond to political pressures, and given their benefit 
and cost structure, the increase in abatement efforts when joining the coalition will impose 
them a severe burden that is not compensated by the augmented global benefits. Bystanders 
are always interested in acting as a singleton with and without lobby influence whereas 
draggers have the same incentives when their abatement costs are high. 
    The situation changes once countries accept the contributions from the industrial lobby 
(pushers and intermediate) or both lobbies (draggers). No country has an incentive to leave 
the coalition. This result might appear strange given that the industrial lobby is interested in 
having the lowest abatement possible. But there are two factors that help to rationalize this 
outcome: the change in the abatement efforts and the increase in payoffs due the 
contributions. As we can observe abatement levels are lower in the case when countries only 
bargain -and receive contributions- from the industrial lobby. When governments are 
expected to behave as draggers, they receive globally a positive contribution from both 
lobbies enough to compensate the increase to the cost due to the increase in the abatement. 
 
 
6 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
A typical feature of simulation method is that results depend on parameter values, which are 
subject to some uncertainty. Given the large number of parameters that enter our model, some 
selection is necessary for a sensitivity analysis. We believe that there is high uncertainty 
concerning the weight given by each government to political contribution compared to social 
welfare from abatement level and to that given by lobby group. Hence, we conduct a 
sensitivity analysis where we change the value of δ. For instance, to capture the idea that 
government cares relatively more about contribution than about social welfare, we assume 
that δ>µ. As µ=1, high δ means that government are more interested by political contribution 
than lobbies. Then, we consider three cases to analyze the influence of government 
preferences on their decision at the international environmental negotiation. That is, we 
consider: δs=0.2 & δns=0.5; δs=1.5 & δns=2 and δs=1.5& δns=0.5;  to study the sensitivity of 
our stable coalitions. These three cases represent respectively the situation in which both 
signatories and non signatories care relatively less about contribution than about 
environmental policy compared to lobbies, the situation in which they care more about 
contribution than about environmental policy and the situation in which signatories are more 
interested by contribution where non signatories care rather about its social welfare from 
abatement level. 
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Proposition 5: 
Government decision at the international environmental negotiation depends not only of its 
benefit cost structure but also on the weight that it gives to political contribution compared to 
social welfare. Industrial lobby contribution reduces government incentives to behave as free 
rider. Nevertheless, the size of stable coalition is small if governments are more interested by 
social welfare and the grand coalition is stable if governments are rather interested by 
political contribution. In addition, if signatory and non signatory present different political 
weight, pushers are the more expected to sustain a large stable coalition; whereas draggers 
form a stable partial coalition if they receive a enough contribution from environmental lobby 
group to compensate their high cost. 
 
     
    Table 3. Lobby coalition which maximize government payoff under stable coalitions 
(scenario δs=0.2 & δns=0.5) 
 
  ecological vulnerability (b) 
  0.01 1 100 
0.01 Singleton 2 2 
1 Singleton Singleton 2 
abatement 
cost (c) 
100 3 Singleton Singleton 
 
 
    First, not only for our base case but also for the scenarios (δs=0.2 & δns=0.5) no large 
coalition is stable regardless of the definition of stability. Only pushers sustain a stable 
coalition of size equal 25 (table 3). The abatement policy applied in this situation is lower than 
that of status quo. Although pushers receive positive contribution from industrial lobby, this 
compensation is not enough to avoid the free riding incentives of each government. 
Differently to the situation where governments give the same weight to social welfare and 
contribution, event if governments have the same lobby support, the fact that they are more 
interested by environmental policy can not give incentive to government, especially pushers, 
to sustain a large stable coalition. 
 
    Table 4. Lobby coalition which maximize government payoff under Stable coalitions 
(scenario δs=1.5 & δns=2) 
     
  ecological vulnerability (b) 
  0.01 1 100 
0.01 Singleton Grande coalition 
Grande 
coalition 
1 Singleton Singleton Grande coalition 
abatement 
cost (c) 
100 14 Singleton Singleton 
 
                                                 
5 The same result when signatories continue to give low weight to contribution compared to non signatories (0.5, 
1.5) or (0.5, 1). Except for pusher, we have partial stable coalition (s = 48 or 28 respectively) when signatory 
receive contribution from industrial lobby and non signatories from environmental lobby 
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    Second, when governments give more weight to contribution over environmental policy 
(δs=1.5 & δns=2), the grand coalition is often stable6(table 4). Basically, intermediates and 
bystander have the same incentives to form a grand coalition and they maximize their payoff 
if they receive contribution from industrial lobby. Concerning draggers, when they have high 
cost they maximize their gain when they accept the contribution from industrial lobby and in 
this case the grand coalition is stable. Given their cost benefit structure and the weight that 
they give to contribution, draggers receive enough compensation from industrial lobby group 
to remain in the coalition. Lobbies transfer reduces in this situation the incentives of free 
riding very important in the case of draggers. Contrary to the case (δs=1 & δns=1) partial 
cooperation is not stable and environmental lobby contribution maximize the gain of draggers 
but is not enough to give them incentive to remain in the coalition. Pushers will realize the 
same gain both in the situation of small stable coalition (s=2), when signatory are immune to 
lobby influence and non signatory receive environmental lobby support (O,E) and in the 
situation of grand coalition s=GC  where signatory receive support from industrial lobby 
group independently of non signatory choice. Pushers are indifferent between the two 
situations, because they don't change their behavior of abatement. 
     
    Table 5. Lobby coalition which maximize government payoff under Stable coalitions 
(scenario (δs=1.5 & δns=0.5)) 
     
  ecological vulnerability (b) 
  0.01 1 100 
0.01 Singleton Grande coalition 
Grande 
coalition 
1 Singleton Singleton Grande coalition 
abatement 
cost (c) 
100 14 Singleton Singleton 
 
 
    Third, the result is closely related to the second point. A conclusion that has been derived 
from the situation in which signatory are more interested by contribution than non signatory, 
is that the grand coalition is stable when government receive contribution from industrial 
lobby (table 5). Pushers, given their high marginal benefit, sustain a large coalition. 
Concerning intermediates and bystanders they may form a large partial coalition but these 
coalitions are only internally stable. Finally draggers, given their high marginal cost, they may 
sustain a stable coalition (s=14) if they receive positive contribution from environmental 
policy enough to compensate the cost related to the increase in their abatement level. 
 
Globally, in the different case presented earlier government has incentives to consider 
lobbies contributions and then to remain in the coalition. Pushers adopt less constringent 
environment policy then in the situation without contribution (Table 6). Then, they globally 
form a large coalition. Draggers have to reduce higher level of pollution than in the situation 
without national support. They receive high level of contribution from their environmentalist 
lobby groups enough to compensate their abatement costs and to increase their gains. 
                                                 
6 The result is the same for all situation in which signatory give more weight to contribution than non signatory 
(1.5, 1), (1.5, 1.5), (2, 1.5). 
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However, lobby groups political support isn’t sufficient to reduce government incentives to 
behave as a free rider. Then, only small coalitions emerge at the equilibrium  
 
 
Table 6: Sensibility analysis 
 
cases Countries 
Abatement 
(no  
contributions) 
Abatement 
(with 
contributions) 
net Gain  
(no 
contributions) 
net Gain  
(with 
contributions) 
Contributions 
Pushers(a)* 
- 
9,9999 
999,990 
9,995 
10 
999,990 
- 
49 999 950 
 
5 107 
- 
 
CIs=0,01 10-2 
Intermediates 
- 
9,901 
990,100 
-- 
- 
49 500 099 
 
-- -- 
Draggers 
(1) 
- 
5 
500 
No 
- 
3737 
 
No No 
Draggers (2)(b) 
0,198 
0,099 
10,097 
0,357 
0,099 
10,867 
98,50 
99,97 
 
101,26 
105,61 
 
CEs= 1,52 
 
 
σ s=
0,
2 
&
 σ n
s=
0,
5 
Bystanders 
- 
9,901 
990,100 
-- 
- 
50,0051 
 
-- -- 
 
Pushers(a) 
- 
9,9999 
999,990 
9,9988 
- 
999,8803 
- 
49 999 950 
 
5 107 
- 
 
CIs=0,003 
 
 
Intermediates 
- 
9,901 
990,100 
No 
- 
49 500 099 
 
No No 
Draggers 
(1) 
- 
5 
500 
No 
- 
3737 
 
No No 
Draggers (2)(b) 
0,198 
0,099 
10,097 
3,309 
0,142 
58,517 
98,50 
99,97 
 
725,19 
801,81 
 
CEs= 704,89 
CEns= 234,77 
 
σ s=
1,
5 
&
 σ n
s=
0.
5 
Bystanders 
- 
9,901 
990,100 
No 
- 
50,0051 
 
No No 
 
Pushers(a) 
- 
9,9999 
999,990 
9,9985 
- 
999,8490 
- 
49 999 950 
 
5 107 
- 
 
CIs=0,0076 
Intermediates 
- 
9,901 
990,100 
9,8512 
- 
985,1246 
- 
49 500 099 
 
4,9984 107 
- 
 
CIs=73,6915 
Draggers 
(1) 
- 
5 
500 
No 
- 
3737 
 
No No 
Draggers (2)(b) 
0,198 
0,099 
10,097 
0,1638 
- 
16,3818 
98,50 
99,97 
 
255,8008 
- 
 
CIs=95,9353 
CEs= -1,2775 
 
σ s=
1,
5 
&
 σ n
s=
2 
Bystanders 
- 
9,901 
990,100 
9,8512 
- 
985,1246 
- 
50,0051 
 
49,9984 103 
- 
 
CIs= 0,0074 
 
 
* : situation b=100 et c=1. Similar result for the other cases. No : means no stable coalition,  -- : the same result than the situation without 
contribution. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
We studied the effect of political pressure groups -lobbies- on the size and stability of global 
environmental agreements. To this purpose we use the framework of two-level games to 
explain how the national political situation influences the decisions of governments at the 
international negotiations arena. In this framework, at the first level of the game (the 
international) government representatives negotiate the terms of an international 
environmental agreement. At the second level, the national, is determined the set of politically 
acceptable actions, available to the national representative during the international 
negotiations. 
    We assumed that national political markets are represented by pressure groups --i.e. 
lobbies. Governments choose whether to bargain or not with a lobby, if they decide to bargain 
with a lobby they can accept contributions from one or more lobbies at the time. We consider 
that there are only two lobbies with which governments can bargain: environmentalist and 
industrial. We consider that the level of contributions depends on each lobby's preferences 
and the abatement strategy chosen (at the international level) by the government. For the 
environmentalist lobby, we assumed that its preferences depend on the global abatement 
efforts and the additional abatement efforts undertaken by the government --with respect to 
the environmentalist ideal point. For the industrialist lobby, we assume that they are always 
harmed by their government abatement decisions and thus the level of total abatement costs 
resulting from the strategy chosen by their government determines its preferences. 
    We consider a three stage game. In the first stage, we have a lobbying game. In this stage, 
we have the bargaining game between government and lobby groups presented earlier. Each 
group propose its political contribution and government try to choose which national political 
coalition it will choose to maximize its objective function at the international level. Then, 
government considers lobby support when it decide about both its participation to the 
international environmental agreement and its abatement level in two following stages Hence, 
in the second stage, we have the coalition game in which governments decide non-
cooperatively whether or not to sign the agreement. Two groups of countries emerge at the 
end of this stage: the signatories and the non signatories. In the third and last stage, 
governments play the non-cooperative Nash emission game, where governments, which sign 
the agreement, play as a single player and divide the resulting payoff according to a given 
burden-sharing rule. 
    To analyze government behavior at the international negotiations and its decision to 
participate to the IEA, we use the approach of "interest based explanation" of international 
environmental policy. Following this approach and considering the information from our 
empirical model in term of ecological vulnerability (marginal benefits, b) and abatement costs 
(c), we classified governments into four categories that correspond to their positions at the 
international environmental negotiation: pushers, draggers, intermediates and bystanders.  
    There are four key results from our analysis. First, the inclusion of political pressure factors 
helps to improve one of the rather "pessimistic" results common to the literature of coalition 
formation and IEAs: only small coalitions are stable. In our analysis, there was an important 
improvement from our benchmark scenario --when governments are immune to political 
pressures- where we did not find any stable coalition. This situation changed once the 
contributions from lobbies are included in the governments' payoff function. We found that 
the grand coalition, when signatories receive support only from the industrial lobby, is stable. 
Thus, contributions help to reduce the free rider incentives present in the grand coalition when 
countries do not receive any support from lobbies- that we labelled as "base case". 
    Second, industrial lobby support helps to reduce free-rider incentives present in our "base 
case". When countries form the grand coalition, the industrial lobby benefits from the 
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decision of each country to have a lower abatement level than in the "base case", hence is 
willing to make a positive contribution to compensate for the associated costs. We observed 
that both pushers and intermediate countries present an incentive to participate in an 
agreement. The countries characterized as draggers and bystanders do not have any incentive 
to form a stable coalition in the "base case". Draggers have an incentive to avoid joining the 
coalition, given its high MAC and low MB levels. The situation changes once lobby 
contributions are considered. These countries would like to have a small abatement level 
whenever they are coalition members. As the abatement level is lower than in the "base case", 
the contributions compensate this type of countries and give then an incentive to stay in the 
coalition. 
    Third, in order to sustain the grand coalition, weak agreements would be negotiated. More 
precisely, when signatories decide to bargain only with the industrial lobby, interested in 
having the lowest abatement possible, they will receive enough contributions to sustain an 
agreement that not involve a high level of abatement -i.e. a weak IEA. We found that, the 
global abatement level, when the grand coalition is stable, is lower than what this coalition 
would obtain in our "base case". Hence, we can conclude that to have a large stable coalition, 
countries (especially pushers) must accept a weak IEA. Hence, stringent environmental 
agreements, if they emerge, will be sustained only by a small number of countries. 
    Finally, government decision at the international environmental negotiation depends not 
only of its benefit cost structure but also on the weight that it gives to political contribution 
compared to social welfare. Industrial lobby contribution reduces government incentives to 
behave as free rider. Nevertheless, the size of stable coalition is small if governments are 
more interested by social welfare and the grand coalition is stable if governments are rather 
interested by political contribution. In addition, if signatory and non signatory present 
different political weight, pushers are the more expected to sustain a large stable coalition; 
whereas draggers form a stable partial coalition if they receive a enough contribution from 
environmental lobby group to compensate their high cost.  
    Regarding future research, we propose two main extensions: First, we can employ a voting 
game theoretic model to characterize the stability of such agreements when each country's 
participation is conditioned upon a domestic ratification vote. Second, our analysis could be 
extended to cover transfer mechanisms. It would be interesting, considering our framework, 
to find the effect of the transfers on the result of the international environmental negotiation 
and the size of stable IEAs that may emerge.  
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